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Many infrastructure networks have a modular structure and are also interdependent with other infrastructures.
While significant research has explored the resilience of interdependent networks, there has been no analysis
of the effects of modularity. Here we develop a theoretical framework for attacks on interdependent modular
networks and support our results through simulations. We focus, for simplicity, on the case where each
network has the same number of communities and the dependency links are restricted to be between pairs
of communities of different networks. This is particularly realistic for modeling infrastructure across cities.
Each city has its own infrastructures and different infrastructures are dependent only within the city. However,
each infrastructure is connected within and between cities. For example, a power grid will connect many
cities as will a communication network, yet a power station and communication tower that are interdependent
will likely be in the same city. It has previously been shown that single networks are very susceptible to the
failure of the interconnected nodes (between communities) [1] and that attacks on these nodes are even more
crippling than attacks based on betweenness [2]. In our example of cities these nodes have long range links
which are more likely to fail. For both treelike and looplike interdependent modular networks we find distinct
regimes depending on the number of modules, m. (i) In the case where there are fewer modules with strong
intraconnections, the system first separates into modules in an abrupt first-order transition and then each module
undergoes a second percolation transition. (ii) When there are more modules with many interconnections
between them, the system undergoes a single transition. Overall, we find that modular structure can significantly
influence the type of transitions observed in interdependent networks and should be considered in attempts to
make interdependent networks more resilient.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many recent studies have explored interdependent and
multilayer networks [3–33]. Further studies have also
explored more realistic structures such as spatially em-
bedded networks [34–39], and different types of realis-
tic failures such as response under degree-based attacks
[40, 41] and localized attacks [26, 38]. Nevertheless, all
previous studies on interdependent networks ignored the
realistic effect of modularity on the resilience of interde-
pendent networks.
Many real world networks have a modular structure in-
cluding biological networks [42], infrastructure such as
the power grid, internet [43] and airport networks [44],
and financial networks [45]. Several studies have ex-
plored the robustness of individual modular systems (i.e.
single networks) [46, 47] yet no study has considered the
effect of interdependence in modular networks. It is well
known that many of these systems are also interdepen-
dent and thus it is crucial to understand how the modu-
lar structure affects the resilience of interdependent net-
works.
There has also been considerable work on understand-
ing various types of attacks on networks [26, 38, 48–
50]. Recent work by Shai et al. [1] developed an ana-
lytical method where the attack is carried out on inter-
connected nodes, i.e. nodes that connect communities.
Further work by da Cunha et al. [2] showed that in real
networks, attacks on interconnected nodes are even more
damaging than attacks based on betweenness. It is par-
ticularly important to consider the effectiveness of this
type of attack in interdependent networks since the re-
searchers in [2] showed that the US power grid is among
the most susceptible networks to this type of attack and
it is well known that power grids are interdependent with
other infrastructures.
In our model we assume modular networks composed
of m modules, and a fixed ratio, α, between the proba-
bility for an intramodule link and intermodule link. We
further fix the total average degree, ktot, of the network.
Using these three parameters we can determine the aver-
age intramodule degree, kintra and the average intermod-
ule degree kinter. We obtain
kintra
kinter
=
α
m − 1 (1)
ktot = kintra + kinter. (2)
Note that kinter increases with m, since networks with
more modules have more interlinks [1]. We generate n of
these modular networks, and for simplicity we assume
that each network has the same m, α and k. We then
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create dependency links between the nodes in the differ-
ent networks. The fraction of nodes in network i which
depend on nodes in network j is defined as qi j. The de-
pendency links are either bidirectional (in our analysis
of treelike dependencies, Sec. III, Fig. 1a) or unidirec-
tional (in our analysis of looplike dependencies, Sec. IV,
Fig. 1b). In both cases we further restrict the dependency
links such that a node in community ma in network i will
depend on a node in community ma in network j, i.e. the
dependency links are within the same community. This
restriction is particularly reasonable in our example of
cities where each city has its own tightly connected, in-
terdependent infrastructure with relatively few connec-
tivity links between the cities.
We focus on the case of attack on the interconnected
nodes, i.e. nodes with at least one connectivity link to
a different module. Many studies have shown that these
links are particularly susceptible to failure in biological
networks and serve as efficient targets in attacking infras-
tructure [2]. Further in our example of cities, these nodes
have the longer distance links that are more likely to fail
[51].
Our attack randomly removes a fraction 1 − r, of the
interconnected nodes in the network until there are no re-
maining interconnected nodes and then continues to re-
move nodes randomly. The fraction of unremoved inter-
connected nodes, r, is related to the overall fraction of
unremoved nodes, p, by
r =
p − p¯inter
1 − p¯inter (3)
where p¯inter is the probability that a node is not intercon-
nected.
We study this model on both treelike networks of net-
works (NoNs) and looplike NoNs (Fig. 1) and find that
there are two distinct regimes depending on the num-
ber of modules, m. In the first regime, for small m, the
network first separates into isolated, interdependent, yet
functional modules, i.e. there is a transition at r = 0.
However, for larger m the network collapses due to the
removal of a finite nonzero fraction of interconnected
nodes. We provide an analytic solution that predicts the
critical point, m∗, where the system has a transition from
one behavior to the other, as well as solutions for the size
of the giant component as a function of the fraction of
removed nodes. We support our theory by simulations.
II. FAILURE AND ATTACK ON INTERDEPENDENT
MODULAR NETWORKS
We now extend the method of Callaway et al. [49] to
the case of interdependent networks or network of net-
works (NoN). We will then specifically apply this frame-
work to the case of interdependent modular networks.
We begin by recalling the derivation in [49] for a single
network i with a given degree distribution Pi(k) described
by the generating function
G(x) =
∞∑
k=0
Pi(k)xk. (4)
For degree based attacks where nodes with degree k are
removed with probability 1 − rk, the generating function
is [49]
F0(x) =
∞∑
k=0
rkPi(k)xk. (5)
The generating function of the branching process is then
F1(x) = F′0(x)/G
′(x). (6)
Following Callaway et al. [49] we obtain the probability
that a randomly chosen edge leads to a cluster of given
size, H1(x), as
H1(x) = 1 − F1(x) + xF1 [H1(x)] (7)
and the probability that a randomly chosen node leads to
a cluster of a given size, H0(x),
H0(x) = 1 − F0(1) + xF0 [H1(x)] . (8)
The fraction of nodes in the giant component is
P∞(x) = 1 − H0(1) = F0(1) − F0(u), (9)
with u being the smallest non-negative real solution of
the self consistency equation
u = 1 − F1(1) + F1(u). (10)
In order to generalize this framework for the case of
attack on a NoN we must include the fact that nodes have
an additional uniform likelihood to fail, 1 − pdep, where
pdep comes from the effect of the dependency links and
depends on the specific topology of the NoN.
In such a case we have that
F˜0(x) = pdep
∑
k=0
rkPi(k)xk (11)
where F˜0(x) is the anologue of Eq. (5) for interdependent
networks and pdep can be extracted from the sum since it
does not depend on the degree of the node. The rest of
the derivation continues the same for Eqs. (5)-(9).
We note that Eq. (10) is the same as before only now
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FIG. 1: (Color online) We study two possible configurations of a network of networks. (a) A treelike network of networks with
full coupling and bidirectional dependency links and (b) a looplike network of networks with a fraction of dependent nodes, q, and
unidirectional dependency links. In both (a) and (b) dependency links are restricted such that they only connect nodes within the
same communities, i.e a node in module ma in network i will depend on a node also in module ma in network j. (c) Demonstration
of the dependency between a pair of interdependent networks shown in (a) and ((b). The dependency is between the same
communities in different networks (same colors).
with the extra factor of pdep, giving
1 = pdep
F1(u) − F1(1)
u − 1 , (12)
and Eq. (9) also will have the same factor pdep. This
pair of equations, Eqs. (9) and (12), can be used to find
the giant component of a NoN under any sort of degree
based attack and can be used as an alternative method to
that of Huang et al. [41] and Dong et al. [40].
We will now generalize this framework to the case
where each network in the NoN is a modular network
with the parameters m, α, and k, defined above. For the
case of a modular network where the modules are made
up of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi structures, Eq. (3) becomes
r =
p − e−kinter
1 − e−kinter . (13)
We recall the results from Shai et al. [1] for the generat-
ing functions
G(x) = e−(kintra+kinter)(x−1) (14)
F0(x) = ekintra(x−1)−kinter (1 − r) + rG(x) (15)
F1(x) = F′0(x)/G
′(x). (16)
We now combine the results from Shai et al. [1] for a
single network with Eqs. (9) and (12) for a NoN. We
note that these equations not only describe the case of an
interdependent modular NoN but also the case where we
have both random failure with probability 1 − prand and
targeted attack. For our purposes we will assume that
prand = pdep, i.e. the random damage is solely the result
of the dependencies. Our new generating functions are
thus,
F˜0(x) = pdepF0(x)
F˜1(x) = pdepF1(x). (17)
The average connected component size is given by Le-
icht and D’Souza [6],
〈s〉 = pdepF0(1) + pdeprkintraF0(1) j0 + pdeprkinter j1 (18)
where
j0 = pdepF0(1) + pdeprkintraF0(1) j0 + pdeprkinter j1 (19)
j1 = pdepr + pdeprkintra j0 + pdeprkinter j1. (20)
Combining the above equations, we find that there is a
giant component that spans the system when
(
1 − prandkintra(e−kinter + rc − rce−kinter ))(1 − prandrckinter) − p2randr2ckintrakinter = 0
⇒ r2c
(
p2randkintrakintere
−kinter) + rc(prandkinter + prandkintra − prandkintrae−kinter − p2randkintrakintere−kinter) + (prandkintrae−kinter − 1) = 0
(21)
3
which can be solved using the quadratic formula for rc.
III. TREELIKE NETWORK OF INTERDEPENDENT
MODULAR NETWORKS
We now consider the case of a treelike NoN (see Fig.
1a) with full dependency and no-feedback, i.e. if network
i depends on network j then each node in i depends on a
single node in j and vice versa. As stated earlier, this can
serve as a good model of infrastructure across cities. We
remove a fraction 1− r of the interconnected nodes from
one of the networks and aim to obtain the mutual giant
connected component. The fraction of nodes which fail
due to the effect of the dependencies is given by
pdep = (1 − e−(kintra+kinter)P∞ )n−1. (22)
This can be understood by noting that each node is a part
of a n-tuple of interdependent nodes and we require that
all these n nodes be in their networks respective giant
components. Therefore, besides the node itself, there are
n− 1 dependent nodes that must all be in their networks’
respective giant components after the initial attack.
If we combine Eqs. (11), (12), and (22) we obtain the
mutual giant connected component in the NoN,
P∞ =

(
e−kinter (1 − r)(1 − e−kintraP∞ ) + r(1 − e−(kintra+kinter)P∞ )
)
(1 − e−(kintra+kinter)P∞ )n−1 0 < r < 1
p
m (1 − e−mkintraP∞ )n r < 0.
(23)
Since the dependency links are within modules, Eq. (23)
for r < 0 is simply the equation for a treelike NoN with
k = kintra and a giant component that is smaller by a fac-
tor of m. Nonetheless the value of pc will be the same
as for a regular treelike NoN with k = kintra. We show
analytic solutions of these equations along with simula-
tions in Fig. 2 for varying m and varying n. By varying
either of these parameters we may have either one or two
abrupt percolation transitions. Note that for the case of
varying n the point of the first abrupt drop is the same for
all curves. This is because the point where the modules
separate depends only on m, α and ktot, but not on n (see
Fig. 3). It is worth noting though that for larger n, the
second regime, where modules exist independently (see
Fig. 3b), may not be present if the individual modules do
not have enough intralinks to survive the damage from
the dependencies.
We demonstrate that in the case where there are two
abrupt transitions, the first transition (at higher p) rep-
resents the separation of the modules and we therefore
have m individual modules functioning separately. This
is indicated by the spike in the size of the second largest
component, P∞2, in Fig. 2c and is demonstrated visually
in Fig. 3. In general for a network composed of m mod-
ules, there are m equal components functioning indepen-
dently. After the separation into modules, we observe a
second abrupt transition due to the interdependence.
As m increases, the network begins to act more like
a regular network of n interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi net-
works. It is clear from the framework developed un-
til now that there exists a critical value of m, m∗ above
which the system undergoes a single transition whereas
below m∗ the system first separates into separate modules
before collapsing entirely.
We will now determine pc and m∗ for this system us-
ing the framework developed in Chap. II. For certain
regimes there exist two first-order, discontinuous jumps
in the size of the giant component (see Fig. 2a). We
define pc as the point where the first (higher p) jump oc-
curs, regardless of whether there is a second jump after-
wards. If desired, the point of the second jump can be
found by solving for the critical threshold for a typical
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi NoN with k = kintra. We will now solve for
pc by first finding rc using Eq. (21) and then converting
it to pc using Eq. (13). We recall that for the case of trees
we use pdep = (1 − e−(kintra+kinter)P∞ )n−1 in Eq. (21) as was
done in Eq. (23). This gives us the following system of
equations
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FIG. 2: (a) and (b) Results of simulations and theory according to Eq. (23) for modular networks with α = 100 and ktot = 4. In (a)
we vary m with n = 2 and in (b) we vary n with m = 2. Note that by varying either of these parameters we may have either one or
two first order transitions (at two different values of p). Note that for the limiting case, m = 1 and n = 2, i.e. the squares in (a) we
obtain the known result of Buldyrev et al. [3] pc = 2.445/ktot = 0.611 for ktot = 4. For larger m, pc increases, implying that
modular networks are more vulnerable under attack. In (c) we show the size of the second largest giant component, P∞2, for the
same parameters as in (a). This plot verifies that the first abrupt drop in P∞ is the result of modules separating and there is a
regime where the largest and second largest components are essentially equivalent. Note as the number of modules increases the
size of the second largest component decreases, yet there are more surviving components, i.e. for m = 10 there are 10 modules of
similar size. In (d) we show pc, defined as the point of the first abrupt drop (at the largest p), as a function of m for several values
of α with ktot = 4. Note that below m∗ pc drops quickly according to Eq. (27) yet as m increases it decreases slowly according to
Eq. (26). The sharp kink where pc changes behaviors is m∗ and for m > m∗ there is only one single transition rather than two.
pdep = (1 − e−(kintra+kinter)P∞ )n−1 (24)
P∞ =
(
e−kinter (1 − rc)(1 − e−kintraP∞ ) + rc(1 − e−(kintra+kinter)P∞ )
)
(1 − e−(kintra+kinter)P∞ )n−1 (25)
rc =
−b + √b2 − 4ac
2a
(26)
5
(a) (b)
FIG. 3: a. Demonstration of the network in the initial state before the attack. The red links are connectivity links and the torquoise
links are dependency links. We highlight the interconnected nodes which will be removed by the attack (note that we only perform
the attack on one of the networks). b. Demonstration of the network after the removal of the interconnected nodes. As shown, the
attack divides both networks into their separate modules and we have two components each of which behaves like a typical
interdependent network of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks.
with the values of a, b and c being the coefficients from
Eq. (21).
We see in Fig. 2d that the simulations fit the theory
well except near the point where we switch to having a
single abrupt transition. This small discrepancy is be-
cause there are large fluctuations in the fraction of in-
dividual modules that are part of the giant component,
which are not considered in the mean-field approach.
Once we move away from this critical point the theory
again fits the simulations.
In order to find m∗ we compare the value of p when r =
0 to the pc for a treelike network of networks with k =
kintra. Essentially this means comparing the fraction of
nodes needed to remove all interconnected nodes and the
value of pc where the modules themselves break apart.
We can trivially find the value of p when r = 0 by
noting that r = p−e
−kinter
1−e−kinter . We obtain in terms of m
p(r = 0) = e−ktot
m−1
α+m−1 . (27)
We note that the value of pc for a treelike network of net-
works (without communities) was determined by Gao et
al. [10]. In order to find pc we first find the value of k¯min,
the degree at which the system undergoes a transition.
This is done using the system of equations
fc = −[nW(−1ne
−1/n]−1 (28)
k¯min = [n fc(1 − fc)(n−1)]−1 (29)
where W(x) is the Lambert function.
Then pc = k¯min/ < k > where < k > is the average
degree of each network, in our case < k >= kintra. We
obtain
pc =
k¯min(α+m−1)
ktotα
. (30)
The value of m∗ is found by setting Eq. (27) equal to
6
Eq. (30) to obtain
k¯min(α+m∗−1)
ktotα
= e−ktot
m∗−1
α+m∗−1 . (31)
This equation can be solved numerically for any value of
n and α. Essentially, there are two competing effects in
this equation. The left side represents the value of pc for
an interdependent network of networks with k = kintra
and the right side represents the point where we have
removed all nodes with an interlink. As m increases,
kintra decreases, meaning that the modules become more
vulnerable and pc from the left side of the equation in-
creases. On the other hand, as m increases, kinter increases
so more nodes have an interlink and pc on the right side
of the equation decreases (more resilient). We demon-
strate these two effects and show the point where they
intersect in Fig. 4a. Further we show the value of m∗ for
various values of α and n in Fig. 4b. Also, as n increases,
k¯min increases, meaning the affect of the interdependence
is stronger. Essentially it causes the dashed curve in Fig.
4a to increase, thus decreasing m∗, the point where the
curves intersect. Thus for larger n we have a lower m∗,
as seen in Fig. 4b.
IV. LOOP OF INTERDEPENDENT MODULAR
NETWORKS
We will now demonstrate our approach on another ex-
ample where we consider the specific case of a directed
loop of modular networks. In this case, for simplicity,
we perform the initial attack on all of the networks rather
than just one of them. Also, whereas the dependency
links in Chap III. were bidirectional here we use unidi-
rectional links as part of a loop (see Fig. 1b). The frac-
tion of nodes which are interdependent is defined as q,
i.e. 1 − q is the fraction of autonomous nodes, and is as-
sumed here, for simplicity, to be the same for all pairs of
networks. Here again, we will only consider dependency
links which are restricted to being between two networks
but within the same module. It has been shown that for
looplike NoNs the number of networks in the loop is not
relevant to the calculation [4, 37, 52].
The equation governing this system is once again Eq.
(12) with pdep = (1 − q + qP∞). Substituing this into Eq.
(12) gives
P∞ =

(
e−kinter (1 − r)(1 − e−kintraP∞ ) + r(1 − e−(kintra+kinter)P∞ )
)
(1 − q + qP∞) 0 < r < 1
p
m (1 − e−kintramP∞ )(1 − q + qmP∞) r < 0.
(32)
We compare simulations and theory according to Eq.
(32) in Fig. 5. We note that here if the system under-
goes two transitions, the first one (at a higher p) is abrupt
and the second one is either continuous or abrupt. For
the parameters we used, looplike networks of networks
undergo a second order transition [10, 52], yet for dif-
ferent values of ktot and q they can undergo an abrupt
transition. For looplike NoNs, the number of networks,
n, does not play a role but increasing q the fraction of
interdependent nodes, weakens the resilience of the sys-
tem (see Fig. 5b). We further note that for looplike NoNs
there is a maximum coupling, qmax above which the en-
tire network collapses even for p → 1. Our value for
qmax will be the same as that of Gao et al. [52], namely
qmax = 1 − 1/ktot since for p = 1 our networks respond
to random percolation like ER networks. Indeed, in Fig.
5b we do not show higher values of q since the system
does not survive even for p = 1 if q > 1 − 1/ktot. For ex-
ample, with ktot = 4 (the value in our plots) we obtain a
maximum coupling of q = 0.75, above which the system
collapses even for p→ 1.
Following the analysis in Chap. II we can find pc using
Eq. (21). In this case pdep = (1 − q + qP∞), which we
will substitute into Eq. (21). Our system corresponding
to Eq. (26) becomes,
pdep = (1 − q + qP∞) (33)
P∞ =
(
e−kinter (1 − r)(1 − e−kintraP∞ ) + r(1 − e−(kintra+kinter)P∞ )
)
(34)
rc =
−b + √b2 − 4ac
2a
(35)
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FIG. 4: a. We show how to obtain m∗ by plotting Eq. (27) and Eq. (30) for the case of n = 2, k = 4, and α = 100. The curve
showing Eq. (27) decreases with m since the number of interlinks increases with m so a larger fraction of nodes have an
intermodule connection. On the other hand, pc in Eq. (30) increases since for fixed k, as m increases kintra decreases so the
modules themselves are more vulnerable. The value of m∗ is determined by the intersection of the two curves. b. The value of m∗
vs. α according to Eq. (31) for several values of n with k = 4 is shown.
with the values of a, b and c being the coefficients from
Eq. (21). We plot the pc obtained based on the theory
and compare with simulations in Fig. 5c.
To find m∗ we use the same method as was done in
Chap. III for treelike networks of networks. Specifically
we compare the pc at which the modules become sepa-
rated and the pc for a network of networks with k = kintra.
We have from Gao et al. [52] that pc for a looplike NoN
is pc = 1k(1−q) . If we solve this and use the representation
with α and m rather than kintra, we obtain
α + m∗ − 1
ktotα(1 − q) = e
− ktot(m∗−1)α+m−1 . (36)
The values of m∗, as a function of α, based on Eq. (36)
can be seen in Fig. 5d. Increasing q decreases the ro-
bustness of the individual modules and thus decreases
the value of m∗ since the system is more likely to col-
lapse before the modules are separated.
V. DISCUSSION
In summary, we have developed a framework for
studying attacks on interdependent modular networks.
Our results show that modular NoNs can behave signifi-
cantly differently from random NoNs or spatially embed-
ded NoNs in that they may undergo two separate percola-
tion phase transitions. One transition occurs (at a higher
p) where the modules become separated, and a second
transition occurs when the individual modules collapse.
For the case of a fully interdependent treelike NoN with
bidirectional dependency links, both of these transitions
are first order, whereas for a looplike NoN with unidi-
rectional dependency links the first transition (higher p)
is abrupt while the second is either abrupt or continu-
ous depending on the parameters. These results might be
relevant for many interdependent systems such as finan-
cial networks, biological networks and are particularly
relevant for models of city infrastructure where most of
the interdependence presumably occurs within a single
city (regarded here as a community) even though there
are connections to other cities. Another reason our at-
tack is realistic for city infrastructure is because the in-
terconnected nodes contain the interconnected links that
are longer and therefore more likely to fail [51].
We also note that the theoretical approach developed
here can be used for many other types of targeted attack
and for other network of network structures as well.
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values of q with k = 4.
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